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Method 
This Policy Issue Review was undertaken to address the following questions: 
 
How do models of patient enrolment operate internationally (eg. voluntary vs. 
mandatory enrolment)? At what organisational level does patient enrolment take 
place? What are the impacts of different types and levels of patient enrolment, 
including an assessment of key strengths and weaknesses? 
 
This report is not intended to be a systematic review of the literature on Australian and 
international models of primary health care enrolment. A systematic review was not possible due to 
time constraints. Nevertheless, it is an overview of enrolment models relevant to Australian 
primary health care. A predetermined report structure was designed, reflecting the dimensions of 
the study questions and searching was targeted, seeking information sources to answer specific, 
predetermined questions. Google, Google Scholar and Pub Med were used to locate information 
sources and supplemented by existing PHC RIS resources and bibliographic references.  
 
Authoritative sources were sought. In most cases this included grey literature from government or 
organisational sources, evaluation reports and organisational web sites as well as articles from the 
published literature. Where possible the information was triangulated in order to confirm sources. 
We sought to provide information on primary health care enrolment models internationally.  
 
A final decision was made to include the following countries and organisations in the report: 
Australia, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Finland, Spain, the United Kingdom (England), Canada 
(the province of Ontario), New Zealand, and within the United States, the Indian Health Service, 
Veterans Affairs, and Kaiser Permanente. The review of the UK was restricted, for brevity, to 
England and in Canada to the province of Ontario and services for Indigenous people 
Models of Patient Enrolment 
 
For people and communities, formal links with an identifiable source of care enhance 
the likelihood that long-term relationships will develop; that services are encouraged 
to pay more attention to the defining features of primary care; and that lines of 
communication are more intelligible. At the same time, coordination linkages can be 
formalized with other levels of care – specialists, hospitals or other technical services – 
and with social services.1 
 
With respect to coordination and continuity of care, a system in which patients are 
registered with a GP appears favourable in that it offers a greater likelihood that 
medical information will be stored in one place, than do systems without patient lists. 
A patient list system is not sufficient [for coordination and continuity], however. 
Individual GPs need to keep comprehensive medical records and maintain good 
working relations with other health professionals in primary and secondary care.2  
 
In Australia, the relationships between service providers and between providers and 
patients are affected by the absence of registration of patients with general practices. 
Although most patients get their chronic disease care from a single practice, the lack 
of a formal relationship leaves GPs uncertain about the extent of their responsibility for 
ongoing care and care coordination, particularly in the area of psychosocial care. 
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Attempts to structure relations between service providers and between providers and 
patients are further hampered by discontinuities between general practice, community 
health and non-government organisations, who work from different locations, in 
different sectors of the health care system, often with conflicting boundaries and 
without shared lines of accountability. This provides a weak base for the teamwork 
and multidisciplinary care required for complex and chronic disease care.3 
 
Australia is the only country examined which does not have patient registration in any region. 
Advantages of this situation include patient choice, constrained only by issues of access and 
information. Disadvantages include a lack of formalised continuity of care, although this may occur 
through patient loyalty. An indication of this in Australian general practice from a market research 
survey undertaken by Brisbane North Division of General Practice in 20004 showed that in the 
Brisbane North area 88% of people indicate that they use the same practice every time they go to 
a GP, with patient loyalty highest in the older age groups, those not in the workforce and low 
income households.  
 
Patient enrolment models feature nationally in UK, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, NZ, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy, and for specific populations and/or provinces in Canada and USA. Formal 
patient links with an identifiable source of care are variously known as registration, enrolment and 
personal lists. Enrolment is mandatory only in the UK (England) and the Netherlands. In the USA, 
registration with an insurance provider is necessary to receive medical services. Despite enrolment 
being voluntary elsewhere, high proportions of the population are enrolled because of the high cost 
of health care without enrolment.  
 
Patient enrolment may take place with a provider, practice, primary care organisation, insurance 
company or local government. Usually patients are registered with a practice or GP, who may then 
be part of another organisational layer such as a primary health organisation. Patients can change 
providers but this option may be limited to several changes per year. 
 
Denmark and England restrict patients to choose a GP or practice within a specific zone. Zoning 
implies the availability of a GP within that zone able to accept patient registrations. In the UK a 
Primary Health Trust is able to intervene when a patient is unable to find a practice willing to 
accept their registration. Zoning has advantages in allocating and controlling budgets if teamed 
with capitation funding, which also provides for GP attention to prevention and to population health 
within a defined area. Research, epidemiology and health service planning is also facilitated due to 
the availability of longitudinal patient data sets.  
 
While national rhetoric usually promotes patient choice, the extent to which patients actually have 
choice of provider is influenced by availability and distribution of providers, access, zoning 
limitations, and having adequate information on which to make a valid choice.  
 
1 Designing a patient list system 
If policy restricts patients to one practice or GP, issues to consider are: 
 Providing informed choice in selecting a practice and/or GP, such as information to patients 
about qualifications, accreditations, language spoken, gender and special interests of GPs. 
 Making provision for alternate care and informational continuity if the nominated GP is 
unavailable or no appointment is available within a reasonable time; in emergency treatment; 
if the patient is travelling or commuting; or prefers to see a GP close to their workplace. 
 Procedure for changing GPs. 
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 Having an incentive for practices to build up a list, so that they compete for patients as in 
Scandinavia where there is a patient shortage. Where there is a GP shortage other 
approaches may be needed.  
 Considering the consequences for patients and providers when linking enrolment to payment 
systems. In a pay for performance system, do ‘non-compliant’ patients get included in 
outcome measurement?  
 Having systems of accountability for maintaining quality in the practice in access, continuity, 
and patient outcomes, as well as for population health and case coordination.  
 Establishing mechanisms to redress perceived deficiencies in care if the patient does not have 
confidence in their nominated GP.  
 
Table 1 Strengths and weaknesses of a patient enrolment system 
Strengths 
• Enhances continuity of care  
• Comprehensive care including prevention and health promotion 
• Keeps patient information in one place 
• Coordination of care within primary care and between primary and secondary care 
providers 
• Compatible with gatekeeping role for primary care 
• Strengths depend on payment systems, other structural elements, accountability 
mechanisms, demand for and supply of providers 
• Allows population health planning 
     Weaknesses 
• Constrains patient choice 
• Does not meet patient needs when travelling, commuting, seeking second opinion 
• May increase bureaucracy and therefore costs 
• Record transfer delays when patients change providers 
• May decrease equity if there are incentives for providers to avoid enrolling high need 
patients 
• GP shortages limit competition between providers 
 
2 International patient enrolment models  
2.1 United Kingdom – England 
Patients in England are required to enrol with a medical centre within their area of residence to 
obtain a National Health Service (NHS) number. If a patient wishes to change practices they can 
register at a new practice without notifying the previous one. The new practice has the 
responsibility of obtaining medical records from the previous practice but the process is speeded up 
if the previous practice is notified of the move. Under the Data Protection Act, 1998 patients have 
the right to access their medical records. They submit a request in writing by recorded mail 
delivery. The surgery or hospital has up to 40 days to respond. Charges (£10-50) are levied for 
viewing or providing copies of records.5  
 
In the UK (England) it is the statutory responsibility of Primary Care Trusts to maintain patient 
lists6. A PCT or more usually a group of PCTs in a region may delegate some of their functions to 
an agency.7 A patient enrols on the list at their GP practice of choice within their zone or at a 
Family Health Service Agency (FHSA) which may provide a shopfront. A FHSA, also called a 
Primary Care Agency or Primary Care Support Service8 is a delegated agency which undertakes 
management of patient lists as well as practitioner lists, organises the payment of GPs and 
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undertakes patient screening services on behalf of several primary care trusts (PCTs). An agency 
appears to be formed through a ‘coming together’ of ‘family health service providers’ (ie. GPs, 
dentists, optometrists and pharmacists)7,9. Family Health Service Agencies are established in 
Dorset and Northumberland. North East Family Health Services Agency7 does the above plus 
information support for NHS choices. Kent Primary Care Agency10 appears to serve the same 
functions under a similar structure.  
 
GP patient registration data for each GP practice are collated in Family Health Services (FHS) 
registers. A recent document11 on the technical process of harvesting GP list data for research 
shows that data are not available from the trusts/PCOs, but are gathered from Family Health 
Service Agencies and collated by the NHS Information Authority. The data have inaccuracies as the 
combined total population of GP practices exceeds the UK population census data, and require 
considerable reconciliation and weighting before they are useful in research. 
 
GP lists can become artificially inflated due to the movement of patients or administrative errors. A 
UK study found a 7% discrepancy between English population estimates based on census figures 
and those based on the registered lists of GPs. An exercise to verify the numbers of 20-24 year old 
patients resulted in 33.5% being delisted.12 
 
2.2 Netherlands 
Insurance funds require that individuals are enrolled with a GP to receive care. Doctors can only be 
reimbursed if the individual is registered. The Health Insurance Act enacted in 2006 changed the 
way GPs were recompensed for their patients. Prior to the new Act, GPs received either a fixed 
amount per annum (from those insured by the sickness funds) or a payment per service (for the 
privately insured). Under the new system, GPs were paid through a mixed funding model (eg. €54 
for enrolled patients and an additional €9 per consultation).13  
 
Patients can be enrolled with only one GP. However if the GP is together in a centre with others 
they are allowed to ‘try out’ others with the possibility of changing to another14. Enrolment is 
electronic, with patients’ personal details entered into the computer at the doctor’s office, to be are 
used in part for financial administration.15 Providers (GPs) must be registered on the BIG registera 
to receive money from the insurance companies, and more generally to use their powers as a 
health professional. People on this register are checked every 5 years to ensure their knowledge 




Patients in Norway enrol with an individual GP (not a practice), registering for the scheme with a 
social security office. The providers of primary health care services for enrolled patients are GPs 
and related primary health care services provided by the County. Reforms introduced in the 
Regular Practitioners Scheme in 2001 aimed to improve the quality of the local medical services, to 
improve continuity of care and ensure a more personal patient–physician relationship. This reform 
also provided a new model for employing GPs, based on contracted physicians in private practice 
where capitation, fee-for-service and out-of-pocket payments form the income of GPs.17  
                                              
a The BIG register was set up in pursuance of the Individual Health Care Professions Act (BIG Act) (Bulletin of Acts, Orders and 
Decrees, 1993, 655) for the purpose of registering the so-called article 3 professions. It is an up to date register of pharmacists, 
doctors, physiotherapists, health care psychologists, psychotherapists, dentists, midwives and nurses that also records any 
limitations to their powers. Only those listed in the register may use the appropriate professional title and make use of the 
powers (reserved procedures) associated with that title. 
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All citizens listed in the National Population Register are eligible. All population groups in Norway 
are treated in the mainstream health care system.17 In Norway the patient list system requires 
each municipality to provide a named GP for every citizen.17 Patients can choose their own GP and 
they are not restricted by region. This accommodates patients who wish to see a GP near to their 
place of work rather than their home. Though enrolment is voluntary, 99.5% of the population are 
enrolled and the unenrolled pay full costs.  
 
A GP is required to give priority to patients on his/her list. Patients may change GPs no more than 
twice a year. This restriction to one GP is balanced by safeguards enshrined in the 1999 Act on 
Patients’ Rights: the right to a second opinion, access to their records, the right to complain and to 
have their case reviewed within 30 days, and for those with long term conditions, the right to an 
individual treatment plan.17 
 
Patients are able to have their case reviewed by a County Medical Officer and the central 
Norwegian Board of Health if they believe that they have received poor quality health care services. 
The authority can check on the quality of the treatment received and overturn decisions where 
necessary. The Patients’ Rights Act ensures that every county has a Patients’ Ombudsman whose 
purpose is to safeguard patients’ rights, interests and legal rights in relation to specialist health 
care, and improve the quality of the health service. There seems to be general agreement that 
such a control system contributes to raising the quality of health services. 17 (p26) 
 
The Regular GP scheme has been evaluated by several research projects commissioned by the 
Ministry of Health and Care Services. According to the Ministry, “the GP scheme is functioning well, 
with 98% of the population having a regular GP. The share of ‘very satisfied’ patients has risen 
from 32% in 2000 to 44% in 2004. Two thirds of the GPs are satisfied with the scheme, and 35% 
are more satisfied with their working conditions now than before the introduction of the scheme… 
99.5% of the population participates in the regular GP scheme, while 21 000 persons (0.5%) have 
chosen to remain outside”.17 (p94) 
 
An interview study with Norwegian GPs has shown a decreased interest in a gatekeeper role since 
the introduction of the Regular GP Scheme.18 GPs are now more concerned with providing better 
services and keep patients satisfied due to competition for patients. A patient shortage may 
contribute to this.19 This concern with patient satisfaction may have led to fewer hospital 
admissions as one study found a statistically significant negative relationship between patient 
satisfaction with GPs and the number of hospital admissions.18  
 
An evaluation by the Research Council of Norway of the Regular GP Scheme also found that 
patients had become more demanding after the introduction of the scheme and GPs were anxious 
about losing their patients. This resulted in unnecessary referrals. A patient is most likely to change 
his or her regular GP if the doctor is not a specialist in general practice, does not have a Norwegian 
citizenship, is male, has few patients on his list or works in central areas. Many people change from 
a male to a female GP each year and would prefer to wait for a female GP than go to a male one.20  
 
A study21 was undertaken using large national datasets to determine whether two perverse 
incentives were occurring: building a long patient list in order to ensure high unearned income and 
rationing consultations, or maintaining a short list and increasing services. The study found that 
fears were ungrounded, that long lists did not lead to rationing, and short lists did not increase 
service production per consultation. 
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2.4 Denmark 
Patient enrolment is voluntary for the whole population of Denmark, without a focus on any special 
group. Danish patients enrol with their GP of choice within 10km of home or 5km in Copenhagen. 
Children are registered separately from their parents, being considered independent subjects. The 
incentive for patients to enrol is free access to general preventive, diagnostic and curative services.  
Patients may consult an ear, nose and throat specialist or an ophthalmologist without referral, but 
they must be referred by their general practitioner to gain access to all other specialist and hospital 
treatment.22 Patients are obliged to attend the GP with which they are enrolled for a six month 
period but after this time they are entitled to change. 
 
Enrolment is voluntary. Individuals who do not register are free to visit any general practitioner 
and any specialist without referral, but they must pay for all services except hospital treatment. 
Very few people choose this second option (only 1.7% of the population), partly due to general 
satisfaction with the referral system and partly because it is more expensive than the first option.23 
Denmark has the highest public satisfaction with health care (of the countries assessed in the 
Commonwealth fund survey in 2002, reflecting the value placed on accessibility of primary care.24 
 
Physicians are responsible for providing services quickly, typically same-day appointments. 
An organized off-hours service ensures accessible care 24 h a day, 7 days a week.24 
 
The number of patients registered with each general practitioner is limited and fixed through 
negotiations between the Organization of General Practitioners, which is part of the Danish Medical 
Association, and the National Health Security System Committee.23 Cost containment is a key 
policy objective in Denmark. Counties limit the number of GPs in order to contain costs. In order to 
buy a general practice, one must have authorisation as a general practitioner from the National 
Board of Health and a license from the National Health Security System (NHSS), which is run by an 
Association of County Councils, with representation from different professional organisations.23 
Mooney considered the strength of the Danish health service is its equity, but prevention is not a 
priority. It scored well in terms of its ability to contain costs.  
 
The question however that hangs over the system is whether it has in a sense 
contained costs too well and not allowed the demand (or need) side to drive the 
system to a greater extent.25 
 
Accountability appears to be focused on cost containment with priority setting decisions focusing on 
which services should be remunerated by fees and which should be capitated. Giving priority to an 
activity by associating it with a fee appears to be a more effective incentive. An example of this is a 
newly introduced fee for preventive consultations, which are supposed to encourage general 
practitioners to offer longer consultations focusing on broader health and preventive activities such 
as education regarding smoking or dietary habits, weight control etc. Previously this type of activity 
was not paid for by the NHSS.23 
 
2.5 New Zealand 
All patients in New Zealand, including Maori and Pacific Islander populations26 have the option to 
enrol with either a provider (GP) who is part of a primary health organisation (PHO) or directly with 
the PHO26. GPs are called the ‘First Level Service’, as primary health care providers, as well as 
gatekeepers26. Children under 16 are able to be enrolled by a custodian. 
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Enrolment is voluntary. It is estimated that as of January 2009, almost 98% of the population was 
enrolled with a PHO.27 The incentives for patients include consistency and continuity of care, and 
greater access to services due to greater funding with enrolled population. Enrolled patients are 
also entitled to discounts in medication, multidisciplinary care, and generally lower health costs. 
Providers receive financial incentives, being funded in part by capitation models.28 
 
From 1 April 2004, all people enrolled with access PHOs as well as all six to 17-year-olds enrolled 
with interim PHOs were required to pay no more than NZ$3 co-payment per item for prescription 
drugs on the national pharmaceutical schedule. This same benefit accrued to all enrolled persons 
over 65 from 1 July 2004. Previously the maximum co-payment was NZ$15 per item. 
 
Enrolment means that the patient agrees to use the PHO or provider as their preferred service 
provider, and they are only allowed to enrol in one provider at a time.28 They are allowed to un-
enrol, and if their provider leaves then they are also able to leave. 
 
Providers are not allowed to deny enrolment to an individual based on anticipated needs for health 
services.28 PHOs are required to provide or provide access to primary health services 24 hour a 
day, 7 day a week.29 If this cannot occur, justification should be provided as to why. If this is 
expected to be occurring as an ongoing issue, alternative arrangements should be negotiated with 
their District Health Board (DHB). 
 
PHOs have a contract with their district health boards regarding funding.28 Specific targets (for 
example, immunisation covering 95% of enrolled children) are negotiated with the District Health 
Board and PHOs are expected to meet these targets annually. Beyond this, it is at the discretion of 
the PHOs and providers within it to negotiate services appropriate to community needs. PHOs need 
to manage referral services, and monitor and review enrolment services. They are also required to 
engage in and provide evidence about continuous improvement processes. 
 
Individuals who were with a provider who then became a PHO provider are informed about the 
move, the benefits and implications of being enrolled, and if they are happy to be enrolled their 
information is aggregated to the PHO records as an enrolee. 
 
New patients must indicate that they wish to become enrolled and use the provider on a regular 
basis, and are then provided with benefits and implications of enrolment. They must authorise in 
writing for their information to be shared with other service providers/Ministry of health, and 
provide any additional details to allow inclusion on the enrolment register.  
 
In New Zealand, patients enrol with their GP or practice of choice and the data are aggregated at 
the Primary Care Organisation level. The District Health Board monitors the data collection process 
to ensure quality and accuracy. Data collected include ethnicity information which is self identified 
and asked according to a standardised question used in the Statistics New Zealand census 2001.28 
On enrolment, the PHO allocates the patient a National Health Index number, which is validated by 
the NZ Ministry of Health Sector Services. It is encrypted in the records to enable de-identified data 
transmission.30 The NHI number enables the Ministry of Health to determine whether people are 
enrolled at more than one PHO. Removing duplication occurs both at PHO and Ministry level.28 
Those who enrol with a second PHO will have their first registration cancelled by the ministry. 
 
The NZ Ministry of Health Sector Services (formerly known as Health PAC) provides PHO 
enrolment, claim, payment and clinical data to the New Zealand Health Information Services for 
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loading into the national data warehouseb. The PHO Enrolment Collection, which is administered by 
the New Zealand Health Information Service is used to monitor and report on patient enrolment 
and to provide data for population health researchc. 
 
2.6 Canada 
The federal government has constitutional authority and responsibility for a number of specialised 
areas of health care (eg. drug prescription and regulation) and the delivery of federally 
administered PHC services to special access groups such as Canadian mounted police force, First 
Nations, Inuit, and Aboriginal groups. Provinces are responsible for the delivery of primary health 
care services, and some such as Ontario have established primary health care structures based on 
voluntary patient enrolment.  
 
Ontario’s new care models all involve patient enrolment, with varying mechanisms of physician 
compensation. As well as straight fee for service, there has been a rapid increase in a blended fee 
for service model in the Comprehensive Care Model and the newer Family Health Groups. Blended 
capitation models include Family Health Networks, Family Health Teams, Primary Care Networks, 
Health Service Organisations and Group Health Centres. Ontario also has salaried models such as 
Community Health Centres and Aboriginal Health Access Centres.31 
 
Family Health Teams (FHTs), first implemented in 200532 are different from other enrolment 
models in Ontario in that they support inter-professional team members. There are now more than 
150 FHTs d which are much like the proposed Australian ‘superclinics’: multidisciplinary teams of 
health professionals ranging from GPs (who tend to be the coordinators) through to nurse 
practitioners, nurses, pharmacists, social workers, dieticians, etc. The FHTs work collaboratively to 
provide comprehensive, accessible and coordinated family health care services to a defined 
population, the majority of which do not currently have a primary health care provider. In addition 
to providing direct health care services, FHTs focus on chronic disease management, disease 
prevention and health promotion, in conjunction with other community-based health care 
organisations such as public health units. 
 
Team composition is determined by the needs of the population. The number of patients is not 
specified but the largest is Hamilton Family Health Team, which serves 250 000 patients, through 
119 GPs, 101 PN, 20 dieticians, 77 mental health counsellors, 21 psychiatrists and 7 pharmacists.33  
 
The main incentive for patients to enrol is having access to services not previously available, 
including: 
 Guaranteed access to general practitioner and other health professionals 
 Access to the after hours services, either through extended office hours or through a 24-hrs 
telephone based service. 
 A one-window, well integrated access point to the health system.32 
 
Enrolment is voluntary. Patients are not required to enrol to continue receiving services, nor will 
they be refused enrolment due to their health status or need for services. All patients in the 
practice of a FHT physician must be invited to enrol if eligible. This is to occur regardless of their 
                                              
b http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/indexmh/sectorservices-about 
c http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/indexmh/phcs-pho-enrolment 
d Another 50 were planned but have been delayed due to financial cutbacks 
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health status. Incentives are offered to physicians to enrol new patients who do not have a family 
physician. Physicians are responsible for the health of whoever is in their list and must monitor 
according to this.32 
 
Patients who enrol commit to seeking treatment from their enrolled group first, unless travelling or 
in an emergency situation; and allowing the ministry to provide their doctor or the FHT with 
information about services they received from different family doctors outside the FHT and some 
preventive care services. They cannot switch their FHT more than two times in a year. Patients 
remain enrolled unless they choose to cancel their enrolment, are no longer eligible for the Ontario 
Health Insurance Program, move outside the geographic area covered by the FHT, enrol with 
another FHT, the physician leaves the FHT, or become a resident of a nursing home or chronic care 
facility. If the patient fails to abide by the obligations set out in the Patient Commitment terms on 
their enrolment form, the doctor may terminate their enrolment. 
 
All FHTs provide services within a comprehensive care framework, including health assessments, 
diagnosis and treatment, primary reproductive care, primary mental health care, primary palliative 
care, patient education and preventive care, and Telephone Health Advisory Service (THAS). Other 
services can be negotiated with the ministry depending on the size of the organisation, the area it 
covers, and the needs of the local community.32 
 
Funding is derived from the Ontario Health Insurance Plan, some fee-for-service gap payments, 
and the Canadian Health Transfer (money paid from the Canadian government which consists of 
cash and tax revenues, calculated on a per capita basis). Funding is provided to workers 
individually within the FHTs. Family physicians in Family Health Teams are compensated via one of 
the following funding models: 
 Blended Capitation Models: Family Health Networks (FHN) or Family Health Organizations 
(FHO); 
 Blended Complement Model: Rural and Northern Physician Group Agreements (RNPGA); or 
 Blended Salary Model (BSM). 
All of the models encourage the delivery of comprehensive primary health care to patients by 
offering physicians the ability to earn incentives, premiums and special payments in addition to 
their capitation/complement payment or salaries for providing targeted services.34 
 
Other health professionals receive salaried funding with the possible addition of sessional funding 
and funding for targeted programs. Specialists may also be funded (if they are in the team) by a 
per-session funding model. Funding is also provided for administration, overheads, and 
infrastructure. Each FHT is supported by an Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care 
coordinator, and an IT team to convert paper records to electronic versions. 
 
FHTs may establish themselves as community-based, provider-based or a mix of community- and 
provider-based groups. Organisations have the option of becoming registered non-profit 
organisations, with a board of directors which includes community representation (ie. community 
groups structure), a provider group, which can be incorporated, a professional association or a 
health partnership, or a mix of both. Funding is affected by this. 
 
All residents of Ontario have a health card which entitles them to free treatment in Ontario. The 
health card number is provided to the GP on enrolment. The patient fills out an enrolment form and 
a consent form for the release of information (name, address, phone number, health number) 
which is posted to MHLTC. The ministry maintains records of enrolments and changes of address 
must be communicated to the ministry by the patient or GP.35,36 The Registration and Claims 
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Branch of the Ministry maintains a Registered Persons Database containing details of all persons 
who hold a Health Card and records are retrieved by Health Card number.37 The Health Services 
Division, Registration & Claims Branch also maintains a Client Agency Program Enrolment (CAPE) 
data base, updated daily. This is a “repository of the association of a registered person with a 
specific physician at a specific agency in a formally recognized program”.38 (p157) 
 
The Ministry of Health and Long Term Care (MOHLTC) notes that in keeping with its ‘commitment 
to flexibility’ it will negotiate the accountability and performance structure of the FHTs. Guiding 
principles for the FHT groups are synonymous with the national regulations of universality, public 
administration, comprehensiveness, portability and accessibility.39 
 
One challenge for Ontario is how to mandate implementation of clinical standards given current 
payment structures. It is up to individual providers to determine the model they want to be funded 
through. Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs) are not yet true commissioners of health 
services, but are planning bodies flowing funding to health service providers. They are responsible 
for negotiating service accountability agreements only with Community Health Centres, and have 
no jurisdiction over fee-for-service physicians or FHTs. Likewise, LHINs have no authority to report 
on the performance of health service providers in the primary care sector – eg. fee for service 
physicians, Family Health Teams – and public health initiatives.40  
 
2.7 USA 
The USA, famously, has no universal health system. Services are provided for specific groups such 
as Medicare for eligible pensioners and the disabled, Medicaid for the eligible poor, the Indian 
Health Service for native Americans who live on or near reservations, and Veterans Health Service 
for those who have given military service. While these services are provided by the USA 
government, they are provided under specific conditions and have strict eligibility requirements, 
including means tests to restrain costs.41,42 
 
For other populations, managed care services in USA such as Kaiser Permanente43 provide a 
comprehensive system of managed care for registered patients. Personal physicians, specialists 
and surgeons and other medical and allied health providers are employed by Kaiser Permanente in 
their services and hospitals. While patients register with Kaiser Permanente and are eligible for all 
their services, during the enrolment process patients nominate a preferred personal physician from 
those who work within the Kaiser Permanente system. They are assisted in choosing a personal 
physician by a database of physicians detailing their qualifications, special interests, gender, 
language spoken and location. Kaiser Permanente also provides collated data on the clinical 
indicators achieved by each medical centre as an aid to choice. 
 
Another system featuring competition in the private health market is the Concierge health system 
which has arisen in USA in the last decade. According to Wikipedia,44 Concierge medicine 
(politically correct term is ‘Direct Care’) is a term used to describe a relationship with a primary 
care physician in which the patient pays an annual fee or retainer. This may or may not be in 
addition to other charges. In exchange for the retainer, doctors provide enhanced care. Other 
terms in use include boutique medicine, retainer-based medicine, and innovative medical practice 
design. 
 
Concierge physicians care for fewer patients than in a conventional practice, ranging from 100 
patients per doctor to 1 000, instead of the 3 000 to 4 000 that the average physician now sees 
every year. All generally claim to be accessible via cell phone or email at any time of day or night. 
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The annual fees vary widely, from US$60 to US$15 000 per year for an individual, with the lower 
annual fees being in addition to the usual fees for each service and the higher annual fees including 
most services. Some concierge practices do not accept insurance of any kind.44 It should be noted 
that this annual fee is not a substitute for medical insurance, and generally does not cover 
consultations outside the practice, laboratory procedures, medicines, hospitalisations or emergency 
care from other providers. In 2004, the Government Accountability Office counted 146 such 
practices, mostly concentrated on the East and West Coasts. The American Medical Association 
does not track the number of concierge practices because the concept is still so new.44 
 
2.7.1 Indian Health Service 
The USA through the Department of Health and Human Services has treaty obligations to provide 
health care for Native Americans and Alaska natives and to provide culturally appropriate 
services.45 There is also an obligation to provide for Tribal Self Determination.46 
 
The Indian Health Service is provided by the US government for members of recognised Native 
American tribes. Most users live on or near reservations but some funds have been provided for 
urban programs. Enrolment is voluntary. Patients do not appear to be formally enrolled with the 
service however they are eligible for services if they are enrolled members of a recognised Native 
American tribe and live on or near a reservation. Some urban residents who fulfil these criteria are 
also able to obtain services through specialised programs. 
 
The eligibility for IHS medical care seems to be relatively loose47,48 but to receive contract health 
services (ie services provided by mainstream health services but paid for by the IHS) the 
requirements are much stricter. Tribes are federally registered and there is a list of recognised 
tribes who are eligible to receive services.49 In addition, one must be a registered member of a 
tribe. How this is done varies according to the tribe but is a formal registration process.47,48,50 To 
receive contract health services the tribal registration or demonstrating descent and living in the 
reservation is required. 
 
The eligibility requirement for Contract Health Services (CHS) delivered by referral to a 
non-tribal facility or provider is stricter than for direct healthcare. To be eligible for 
CHS, an individual must reside within a CHS Delivery Area (CHSDA) and be a member 
of a federally recognized tribe or descendant of an Indian who was living in California 
on June 1, 1852 and living on or near the established CHSDA.48 
 
3 Choice, competition and innovation 
The facilitation of patient choice in healthcare is a feature of all the health systems examined for 
this review and is an ongoing tradition in Australia. Choice stimulates innovation through 
competition for patients and/or the capitation funding that they bring. The concept of free choice 
underpins the reliance on market mechanisms for delivering health services. 
 
Patient choice balances supply and demand in a geographical area or between areas and thus is 
necessary for ensuring good access to services as patients gravitate to where there is least wait for 
services.51,52 Patient choice also leads to service improvement as patients select practices where 
desired services are provided, such as home visits or out of hours appointments, where they have 
experienced or heard about high-quality care or the good interpersonal skills of practitioners.53 
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3.1 Informed choice 
While all the countries examined in this review provide patients with choice of their primary health 
care provider, in practice, there is variation in the extent to which patient choice is a reality. Choice 
may be limited through zoning, through GPs and practices having full lists, through the patient’s 
ability to pay (in the USA), and by the adequacy of information on which to base a valid choice. 
The literature suggests that patients, particularly in Europe, are very poorly informed.54,55,56 If 
choice is to be a true driver for reform, then patients must have access to appropriate information 
to enable informed choice of GP or practice. 
 
…While patient choice features prominently in primary care policy, there is little 
evidence that it is happening in practice. Of course, some patients have good reasons 
not to shop around for a general practice — for example, people with chronic 
conditions who value continuity of care and a stable GP relationship. Nevertheless, far 
more attention has been paid to developing competition in primary care than to 
building an infrastructure to support patient choice. PCTs raised concerns about low 
public awareness of the right to choose a GP and the shortage of reliable public 
information about the availability and quality of local services. Unless this changes, the 
potential benefits of a more plural provider market may not be realised.57 
 
3.2 Informed choice in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport58 has designed their insurance based system 
to be competitive in nature. This means that both the insurance companies and the service 
providers must compete on the cost and quality of care, whilst still maintaining a service standard.  
 
In the Netherlands individuals are free to choose their insurance provider as well as their health 
care provider. Consumers are able to change their insurance providers annually to create greater 
competition between insurance companies.59 Insurers purchase the services of general 
practitioners and other health providers. This competitive system is designed to stimulate the 
service providers and the health insurance companies to offer higher levels of care.60 
 
If individuals are unhappy with the nature and type of services received from the insurance fund, 
they are able to make changes annually. In the Netherlands, choice is somewhat constrained due 
to the fact that only providers who are registered with the insurance agency (via the 
BIG register) are able to be chosen. The Netherlands has developed a system to inform the public 
about the efficacy of particular health providers.v 
 
3.3 Informed choice in the UK 
In the UK where patient choice is emphasised as a policy priority the ability to see their GP of 
choice is a measure in the yearly survey by the English Department of Health of patient experience 
in general practice.61 Patient experience statistics are provided publicly down to the practice level 
allowing people to choose practices informed by the experience of previous patients. Statistics for 
England as a whole show that in 2006-7, 88% of the people who desired to do so were able to get 
an appointment with their preferred GP within a practice.61 Ability to access their choice of practice 
was not addressed by the survey. Participation by practices in the patient experience survey is 
optional but it triggers payments to reward practices according to performance on their patients’ 
waiting times for GP services and choice of hospital services.  
 
                                              
v Only available in Dutch http://www.kiesbeter.nl/algemeen/default.aspx 
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Baker et al.,62 in a survey of 1 437 people from 22 general practices in London found that 
consulting someone known and trusted was important to 62.6% of responders and 13.7% of these 
had not experienced it at their last consultation. Another UK study63 of 25 994 adults from 53 
practices found that patients in the five practices with personal list systems were more likely to be 
seeing their usual doctor, as were older patients, those with longstanding physical problems or with 
psychological problems. List sizes over approximately 6 000-6 500 were associated with marked 
reductions in personal continuity.  
 
A number of UK studies looking at what patients want found that individuals balanced their 
preference for seeing their GP of choice with the likelihood of obtaining a timely appointment. They 
preferred quick access to an available GP for minor or temporary conditions, but would prefer to 
wait to see a familiar medical practitioner who was well informed about their case when they had a 
problem causing uncertainty, had chronic, complex or emotional problems or needed a routine 
check-up.63,64,65,66 
 
3.4 Level of registration 
The review found several different options for patient registration which relate to the payment 
systems and structures of the countries examined. Patients register with an individual GP or 
practice in Denmark, Norway and in Family Health Teams in Ontario, Canada. In New Zealand and 
England, patients register with a GP or practice who is part of a regional organisation. The New 
Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy is based on regional meso-level organisations, the Primary 
Health Organisations (PHO).67 People enrol with a GP or practice of their choice and the GP lists are 
aggregated to form a PHO register. PHOs are not able to refuse patients’ registration. Enrolled 
citizens receive population health and preventive care through the PHO. 
 
Registration with an insurance provider or service takes place in the USA Veterans’ Health Service, 
Kaiser Permanente, and the Netherlands which requires citizens to enrol with one of the insurance 
companies, which compete with each other on the level of services provided. In the Netherlands, 
patients can be registered with only one GP but they are allowed to ‘try out’ other GPs in the same 
centre if contemplating change.14 Patients of the USA Veterans’ Health Service nominate a home 
medical centre and patients of Kaiser Permanente nominate a personal GP, but are able to visit any 
other facility of the same service while travelling.41,43 
 
Patients in the UK can register at a FHSA, in Norway at a social security office and in New Zealand 
at a PHO. 
 
3.5 Should registration be compulsory? 
Considerations of whether to make registration mandatory depend on the requirements of the 
funding system. Where enrolment is optional those who choose not to enrol may pay full costs or a 
co-payment, not receive population health or preventative care, and may not being provided with 
medical services within the public system. 
 
Where registration is voluntary it is taken up by very high percentages of the population. In 
Denmark and Norway enrolment is voluntary; those who do not enrol are able to see any GP but 
must pay full costs and a GP is required to give priority to patients on his/her list. In practice, 
enrolment levels are very high (99.5% of the population in Norway).17 In NZ enrolment is not 
compulsory, but almost 98% of the population were estimated to be enrolled with a PHO27 as of 
January 2009. Registration is mandatory to receive medical services in the UK. In the USA and 
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Netherlands it is mandatory to be enrolled with one of the insurance providers in order receive 
medical services. 
 
3.6 Ability to refuse or deregister patients 
Funding and GP remuneration methods may result in the registering organisation managing their 
lists so as to maximise profitability. New Zealand has established an audit procedure to ensure that 
patients are not refused enrolment on the basis of their healthcare needs.28 In California, outcome 
measurement using clinical indicators for assessment of quality may have led to deregistering of 
non-compliant patients as these patients could not be excluded from the assessment.68 Similarly, a 
study of patients removed from lists at GP request during successive waves of fundholding 
conducted in Northern Ireland found a small increase in the removal of patients from the lists of 
practices which became fundholding practices during the preparatory year.69 
 
A patient's demographics and utilization are associated with the probability that the 
patient will switch PCPs [primary care providers]. Capitated PCP payment was 
associated with higher rates of switching among high users of health care resources. 
These findings raise concerns about the continuity and quality of care experienced by 
vulnerable patients in an era of changing financial incentives.70 
 
Having a circumscribed defined number of patients registered to a GP or a practice can be a way of 
managing workload and the quality of care that can able to be provided to patients. It can also, as 
in Denmark, be a way of governments controlling health care costs by controlling the numbers of 
GPs practising in a zone and their list size. A consequence of this is that at times patients are 
constrained in their choice through not being able to register at a practice with a full list. 
 
In the UK general practices should accept a new patient if they live in the prescribed catchment 
area, but are able to refuse if they are not accepting new patients at the time. They may also 
refuse a patient if they live outside the area but may not discriminate on any other basis. A 
Primary Care Trust can intervene if a patient cannot get onto a GP list in their zone. If a particular 
medical centre has a full list, they can be compelled by the Primary Care Trust to accept a patient 
in their area. 
 
In New Zealand, Primary Care Organisations are not allowed to deny enrolment to an individual 
based on anticipated needs for health services.28 PHOs are required to provide or provide access to 
primary health services 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.29 If this requirement cannot be met, PHOs 
must justify why and negotiate alternative arrangements with their District Health Board if lack of 
24/7 access is expected to be an ongoing issue. PHOs are able to deregister patients if their 
relationship with their provider is severely compromised or if fee for service records show that the 
patient is regularly receiving services from another provider. Patients are automatically 
deregistered if they do not have contact with the health service for three years and have not 
indicated a desire to remain enrolled.28 
 
3.6.1 Equity 
There are two dimensions of equity in health care: equal access to health care (for equal health 
needs) and equal payment for health care (whether through premiums or taxes) based on income 
or wealth. Equal access to health care (for equal need) implies that the resources of the health care 
plan should be distributed only in accordance with health care needs. An equal payment for equal 
income or wealth implies that financing should be according to ability to pay rather than level of 
sickness. 
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Even if ‘open enrolment’ is stipulated (under which a plan or a practice must, in principle, accept all 
applicants), Newhouse71 showed how plans can effectively deter high-risk applicants or encourage 
high-risk members to leave the plan. With risk-adjusted capitation, plans may still have an 
incentive to scrutinise potential members to assess whether their expected annual costs exceed 
their capitation payments and to reject those for whom this is the case. However, the potential 
gains are considerably reduced.72 If left unattended, ‘cream skimming’ would lead to increasing 
inequalities in premium rates and profit levels between plans that practise it and those that do not. 
In the extreme, it might lead to certain sections of the population being unable to find insurance, 
and a breakdown in the health care insurance market. 
 
3.7 Changing practices 
Patients were permitted to change GPs in all the countries studied, though Canada, Denmark and 
Norway limit changes to twice in a year. The UK has a cumbersome procedure for changing 
practices. A patient can register at a new practice without notifying the previous one. In addition to 
the time and trouble involved in changing registrations, switching to another GP imposes costs in 
the form of a lower initial level of care.53 
 
Medical records are transferred with a significant delay. The new practice has the responsibility of 
obtaining medical records from the previous practice but the process is speeded up if the previous 
practice is notified of the move. Procedures to access medical records can be time consuming. 
Under the Data Protection Act 1998 patients have the right to access their medical records. They 
submit a request in writing by recorded mail delivery. The surgery or hospital has up to 40 days to 
respond. Charges (£10-50) are levied for viewing or providing copies of records.5  
 
4 Enrolment and continuity of care 
Many international health care reform processes have identified continuity as a key variable to the 
reforms’ success. Reforms consider patient enrolment and lists as the optimal way for primary 
health care providers to track patient progress over time.73 In Norway, the Regular Practitioners 
Scheme aimed to achieve personal continuity of care.17(pxv) The ability for GPs to provide 
continuity is significantly affected by the number of people of their lists. In the UK, whilst patient 
enrolment was significantly associated with continuity of care, those with list sizes of 6 000 to 
6 500 were associated with a marked reduction in continuity.63  
 
Continuity refers to care administered over time by a single individual or team, and to the 
continuous effective communication of health-relevant information between the patient and the 
team74. A number of different forms of continuity are relevant to PHC, including: 
 Relational continuity where health care is delivered by the same health care provider. This 
includes knowledge of the patient’s preferences, trust and good expectations due to positive 
past experiences. This is held in the memory of the practitioner rather than being formally 
documented. 
 Informational continuity, or formally recorded information that is usually complemented by 
the clinician’s tacit knowledge of patient preferences; 
 Management or team continuity which is the shared management/care protocols and plans, 
with explicit roles and responsibilities by those administering the care. This can extend 
beyond the primary care setting into secondary care75,76  
 
Primary Health Care Research & Information Service 
www.phcris.org.au 
Models of patient enrolment          16 
Sustained continuity of care encourages communication, so clinicians gain more familiarity with the 
patient over time. This enables the GP to treat chronic conditions more effectively.74 
 
The recent focus on accessibility and treatment with multidisciplinary teams has reduced the ability 
of systems and practitioners to provide continuity77, despite the value placed on it by patients, 
clinicians, and researchers who find that it is an important aspect of care especially for those with 
complex, chronic and multiple conditions78. Indeed, a balance of access, provision of care by 
multidisciplinary teams, and continuity of care is only possible in a system where the supply of 
health care exceeds the demand. This is not the case for Australia. 
 
A 2002 Commonwealth Fund survey found that Australians were at a high risk for care coordination 
communication failures and medical care errors. A systematic review by APHCRI found continuity of 
care via a structured relationship between patient and provider (patient enrolment) was a way in 
which this issue could be overcome or circumvented. Positive health outcomes were reported in 19 
of 29 studies, and patient satisfaction rose conclusively in 8 of 12 studies.79 
 
Australia is increasingly facing an issue with the treatment of chronic disease, together with the 
complexity of treating multiple diseases (on average, 2-3 per person). Continuity is considered 
very important by those with chronic illnesses, because of the development of trust with the 
practitioner, the confidence to express their needs, and the time-saving factors for both the patient 
and the GP.  
 
4.1 Benefits from continuity of care 
Enrolment may tie individuals to a particular provider, thereby emphasising explicitly and formally 
a relationship between the two individuals. Higher continuity is associated with a higher level of 
trust between a patient and a physician. Efforts to improve the relationship between patients and 
physicians may improve the quality and outcomes of care.80 
 
Continuity of care has been associated with lower annual health care expenditures.74 This is 
potentially attributable to the reduction in costly hospital admissions. Numerous studies have found 
that increases in continuity of care are associated with decreases in Emergency Department 
usage.74,81,82 Similar phenomena have been found in paediatric populations.81,83,84 In a group of 
men with heart and respiratory diseases, increased continuity led to fewer hospital days (by almost 
half), fewer intensive care days (a third), shorter lengths of hospital stays (by ten days, cited by 
Harding).74 Continuity also influences medication compliance, with significant increases linked with 
continuity increases.85 
 
Personal, continuous care is linked with patient satisfaction. If patient satisfaction is accepted as an 
integral part of quality health care, reinforcing personal care may be one way of increasing this 
quality.86 It tends to give the patient the impression that the physician is able to treat them, and 
may also make talking about their condition easier.74 It appears that continuity increases quality of 
care, especially for those with a chronic condition. Since the longest of the experiments spans two 
years, it is quite possible that the full extent of the effect of continuity of care for those with 
chronic conditions are not known.74  
 
4.2 Disadvantages to enrolment 
A number of disadvantages have been noted in studies that take a case-study and focus group 
approach. Enrolment may disadvantage patients who want a second opinion in a different practice 
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and patients who do not wish to discuss a particular problem, for example an embarrassing one, 
with their own GP or another one in the same practice. 
 
The main disadvantage identified was potentially missing slow change, such as a patient 
developing hypothyroidism. A few GPs said that too close a relationship risked doctors’ being 
unable to be objective about a patient's problems, and could make patients less self-reliant and 
inappropriately dependent on the doctor.78 There was some speculation that GPs could become 
complacent if one was treated by them for too long, and individuals still wished to be able to gain a 
second opinion. 
 
The range of available services may be reduced for patients enrolled in organisations too small to 
provide population based services and manage budgets for referred services, which is relevant to 
regional, rural and remote areas. 
 
Trials of patient registration programmes show job satisfaction among GPs is variable. Whilst it 
allows GPs to know their patient better, and build a rapport with them, they likewise can suffer 
from increased stress due to their responsibility87 This is particularly pronounced when they cannot 
control their list size.88 Enrolment and the financial systems involved (likely some degree of 
capitation remuneration) may also create financial incentives for providers to avoid high-need, 
high-utilising patients.70 However, this may be possible under the current system in Australia 
already. 
 
4.2.1 Do patients want continuity of care? 
A plethora of research shows that increases in continuity are associated with increased patient 
satisfaction.53,66,86 If there is provision for speedy access to care when needed, then an emphasis 
on continuity is advantageous for long-term care provision. In the UK where there were walk-in 
centres provided for people who did not wish to wait for care from their normal provider, patients 
valued continuity with their providers above speedy access to care.78  
 
5 Accountability and enrolment  
Internationally, reform and strengthening efforts have adopted similar approaches to getting health 
systems to perform better: downsizing, privatisation, competition in service delivery, performance 
measurement and indicators, and citizen participation. All these approaches converge in 
emphasising accountability as a core element in implementing health reform and improving system 
performance.89  
 
Accountability has become a major issue in health care.90 It involves a justification for health 
expenditure, care-related responsibilities, and provides the core element for improving system 
performance. There are three broad purposes of accountability for health systems and providers89: 
 To control the abuse of public resources, particularly in the area of finances 
 To provide assurance that the resources are being used according to specific legal and 
professional standards, and 
 To support improved service provision and management via feedback mechanisms from the 
obtained performance data. 
 
Three critical components to health accountability are specification of the accountable body or 
group and their relationship to the second party; areas in which this group is accountable; and 
formal and informal procedures of accountability. 
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In the context of enrolment, the focus is on the providers as the accountable individuals/ groups. 
Providers may be health organisations such as Primary Health Organisations in New Zealand, or 
single GP providers such as in Norway. Providers may be accountable to national health boards or 
sub-divisions such as adverse events reporting bodies.  
 
A move towards the centrality of accountability represents the movement from professional, 
provider-centred care to more economic and politically accountable models where the citizen-user 
is a consumer. This shift is important in a number of ways with regards to accountability. The 
domains of accountability shift with this change in model. Traditionally accountability was primarily 
focused on professional competence, as well as legal and ethical standards. A focus on the patient 
as a consumer shifts accountability to include financial performance, as well as topics which are 
deemed to be politically important by the public. 
 
It likewise reflects a change in accountability relationships. Previously this relationship rested on 
physicians/ providers’ accountability to their provider representative bodies with little or no input 
from the public or funding bodies. Patient centred models emphasise interactions between 
physician/ providers and consumers, with regulatory mechanisms by the government overseeing 
the process. It also includes the compulsory representation of citizens and interest groups on 
important regulatory boards. 
 
As will be seen, this is reflected in the modes of accountability internationally today, in which 
health care reforms are placing less importance on accreditation and licensing. Increasingly, 
accountability mechanisms include: 
 National or district health service fundholding  
 Legal regulatory policies and acts which protect consumers 
 Standardisation of price for physicians services 
 Budgetary accountability for finances 
 Public provision of quality-of-care and performance information about GPs 
 Citizens’ opportunity to change providers if their performance is inadequate 
 Reserved citizen board membership for health related matters.89 
 
A survey in the USA91 indicated unanimous agreement among researchers, clinicians, purchasers, 
accreditation bodies and government representatives on the importance of provider accountability 
in primary health care service provision. The greatest level of variation in health outcomes was at 
the level of clinicians rather than health networks, insurance plans or hospitals in which GPs are 
based. This indicates that users of the health are likely to seek out information on individual 
providers to select their physician of choice. 
 
The key areas of accountability which will be examined are financial, performance or quality. The 
means by which accountability is assessed include negotiated contractual agreements with state or 
federal bodies, registration/ accreditation bodies as well as public accountability and transparency 
processes. 
 
5.1 Financial accountability 
Most enrolment providers are individuals (GPs), the majority of whom are paid on a combination of 
capitation and fee-for-service arrangements. There is no need for financial accountability beyond 
the fact that the patient is enrolled with them and attended the consultation. Financial 
accountability in Denmark is characterised by a focus on cost containment with priority setting 
decisions focusing on which services should be remunerated by fees and which should be 
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capitated.23 There are still auditing systems in place for unexpected fee-for-service deviations. In 
Denmark, each GP's activity is monitored by a committee representing both GPs in the county and 
the county health authorities. Deviation by more than 25% in expenditure per patient, or by more 
than 40% in services, leads to an investigation and, if the explanation is unsatisfactory, a sanction 
can be applied92. 
 
There is more scope for funding accountability for Ontario’s Family Health Teams (Canada) and the 
Primary Health Organisations in New Zealand, as funding is not necessarily based on a per-patient, 
per-consultation fee for the direct services provided. In Ontario, the Ministry of Health and Long 
Term Planning requires a three stage financial planning and accountability process. The exact 
details depend on the outcomes of negotiations with the Department and on the structure of the 
Family Health Team (not-for-profit, incorporated, or a mixture). The Teams are required to submit 
budgets which specify projected cost and timeframe for activities undertaken by the team. An 
internal control system is required to document the ongoing revenue and expenditure of the 
organisation, which must also submit audited financial statements and other financial documents to 
the Ministry for inspection. In New Zealand, the Primary Health Organisations receive funding for 
administration as well as the services provided. They must report on their financial activity via 
budgets and annual reports, and make these available to the public. 
 
5.2 Quality and continuous improvement  
5.2.1 Through peer review 
In 1976, the Netherlands implemented a national program for peer review in response to 
expressions by physician groups that they needed assistance in the development, establishment 
and management of quality assurance (QA) processes.93 The groups are linked to the professional 
medical associations (comparable to the Royal Australian College of General Practice) who assist 
them in standard setting. This program was directed primarily at hospital-based GPs, was entered 
into voluntarily on a hospital-by-hospital basis, and was developed with a long-term focus. 
Committees of staff members from different hospitals travel to individual hospitals giving 
assistance and advice. 
 
5.2.2 Through registration bodies 
Australia currently engages in quality assurance for GPs via accreditation by AGPAL and other 
bodies. These bodies assess general practitioners against quality standards developed by the Royal 
Australian College of General Practice. The Australian Government offers financial incentives for 
practices to become accredited. GPs in Australia are registered with state Medical Boards, soon to 
become a national Board. GPs who are fellows of the RACGP or ACRRM must earn sufficient 
continuing professional development and quality assurance points each triennium to maintain their 
membership.  
 
The Netherlands likewise uses GP registration as a way of maintaining quality. In order to practice 
providers in the Netherlands must be on the ‘BIG register’ which is maintained by the Health Care 
Insurance Board with representatives appointed by the federal government. Providers must be on 
this register in order to receive payment for their services, as well as to act as a health professional 
generally. Individuals on this list are audited every 5 years to ensure they are meeting an adequate 
standard of care. A failure to meet these standards results in de-registration.16 The Dutch college 
of general practitioners has, since 1989, developed 77 standards to serve as the core of quality-
improvement efforts in general practice across the Netherlands.94 
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5.2.3 Through population health targets and clinical indicators 
In the USA, the Indian Health Service utilises a two-fold measure of performance indicators. The 
first relates to public transparency. The Indian Health Service has developed seven performance 
measures based on the indicators of diabetes management, and the appropriateness of care for 
other chronic conditions, to allow the public access to information the quality of care provided by 
each health service in their local area. This method of accountability was meant to ensure that 
patients had choice of provider if they were unhappy with their current one, however this falls short 
due to low provider numbers generally. The Indian Health Service also reports on population health 
targets to Congress and Office of Management and Budget (OMB). These again are based on 
chronic disease management, oral health, immunisations, and behavioural health measures, and 
are less specific performance measures than the transparency measures.95 
 
In New Zealand, specific national health priorities are developed by the federal government, with 
the expectation that they will be rolled out by individual practitioners within primary health 
organisations. These national priorities, together with other strategies such as the Maori Health 
Plan and immunisation programs are developed into specific targets for the PHO population within 
a Negotiated Service Agreement. PHOs are accountable to the district health boards as well as the 
Ministry of Health on their ability to meet these targets.27  
 
The USA Department of Veteran Affairs has developed a performance framework for the health 
care standards of SVA health centres.96 Each fiscal year, published information derived from the 
reports is available to the public. Each item in the framework has a preface explaining its public 
benefit and emphasises measures to ensure accuracy in providing health and other benefits to the 
correct people with the correct amount and in containing costs. These surveys are analysed on a 
provider-by-provider basis. 
 
5.2.4 Through market competition 
Explicit government-regulated market competition exists in the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
through private health insurer systems such as Kaiser Permanente in the US. Public accountability 
exists in these models via the ability of the patient-consumer to choose their health fund, and 
change it if services are not satisfactory. There is an implicit requirement for the attractive services 
to be provided, and for services to maintain higher and more competitive standards in order to 
attract customer-patients. Information regarding provider performance is normally easily available. 
Any system which permits users to un-enrol from their providers includes a degree of market 
competition (including Australia currently). Dissemination of information regarding the performance 
of the provider is a critical factor in making the system competitive. 
 
5.3 State and organisational legislation 
GPs within enrolment systems work within national legislative requirements, which vary in 
specification from a prescription of services to be provided by enrolment groups, to guiding 
principles for individual providers. GPs tend to be accountable via negotiated contractual 
agreements with intermediary bodies such as state, province or county governments, or health 
insurance organisations.  
 
The NZ government has developed a specific set of national health priorities against which provider 
groups must be accountable via district health boards who fund them. Primary Health 
Organisations enter into specific contracts with the district health boards. The annual negotiations 
have specific targets which are formulated from the national health priorities. The targets include 
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continuous improvement processes, health promotion activities, access to healthcare for high 
needs groups, and referral management. 
 
The Danish Ministry of Health is responsible for formulating goals for health care policy, developing 
legislative frameworks for the provision of care and setting standards against which reporting 
should occur.92,97 GPs in Denmark work within agreements negotiated by their counties with the 
National Health Board, based on the idea that the counties are better able to respond to local 
need.25 As county guidelines are vague, it is thought that national priority setting could be utilised 
more readily.  
 
UK practitioners work within National Service Frameworks for chronic conditions such as heart 
disease and diabetes. These frameworks are monitored via a series of audits by the provider 
organisation as well as Primary Care Trusts, and a national system of monitoring and inspection by 
the department of Health.98 Financial incentives are also offered to meet national targets under the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework, as an adjunct to other quality improvement initiatives. Allowing 
exception reporting , on the grounds that evidence-based guidelines were never intended to apply 
to every patient, has made it easier to align managerial with professional incentives, and to avoid 
inappropriate distortions of care.99 
 
The Ministry of Health and Long Term Care in Ontario, Canada is focused on flexibility and 
responsiveness of the primary health care sector to local needs. The Ministry engages in 
individualised accountability and performance structures negotiated together with the Family 
Health Teams with which the patients are enrolled. It has developed guiding principles that must 
be covered by the Teams. The principles specify the types of services to be provided (including 
after hours, and telephone services), the delivery of patient-centred care, assisting patients in the 
navigation of the health care system, a focus on chronic disease prevention and management, and 
the integration of the service with local community representative and organisations.39 
 
One challenge for Ontario is how to mandate implementation of clinical standards given current 
payment structures. It is up to individual providers to determine the model they want to be funded 
through. LHINs are not yet true commissioners of health services, but are planning bodies flowing 
funding to health service providers. They are only responsible for negotiating service accountability 
agreements with Community Health Centres; they have no jurisdiction over fee-for-service 
physicians or FHTs. Likewise, LHINs have no authority to report on the performance of health 
service providers in the primary care sector, such as fee for service physicians, Family Health 
Teams, and public health initiatives.40 
 
5.4 Accountability to the public 
5.4.1 Through complaints mechanisms 
Most countries have patient complaints mechanisms to encourage GP accountability for services 
provided by them. This becomes especially pertinent when enrolment precludes the ability for 
consumers to change easily to another provider. 
 
Australia currently has complaint mechanisms managed by independent ombudsmen on a state-
by-state basis. Individuals are generally required to follow up any disputes with the provider, and if 
their response is unsatisfactory to refer the case to the ombudsmen. The ombudsman may act as a 
mediator, or refer the issue to regulatory bodies and other government departments if the issues 
are of a serious nature. State Medical Boards provide another avenue for complaint against 
individual medical practitioners.  
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Similarly, Norway entitles patients to have their case reviewed by a County Medical Officer and the 
central Norwegian Board of Health if they believe that they have received poor quality health care 
services. The authority can check on the quality of the treatment received and overturn decisions 
where necessary. Mechanisms include a patient rights system with access to a second opinion, an 
ombudsman, and investigation of concerns/complaints. In Norway the restriction to one GP is 
balanced by safeguards enshrined in the 1999 Patients’ Rights Act: the right to a second opinion, 
access to their records, the right to complain and to have their case reviewed within 30 days, and 
for those with long term conditions, the right to an individual treatment plan.17 Kaiser Permanente 
also has a patient complaints facility on their website. 
 
In 1994, NZ developed a system with an independent health and disability commissioner. The 
Commissioner is responsible for ensuring compliance of providers with relation to the rights of 
health consumers. These rights are legislatively set by the federal government.100 Consumers of 
the NHS in England have the right to take their complaint to the independent Parliamentary and 
Health Service Ombudsman if they are not satisfied with the way the NHS has dealt with it.vi  
 
 
5.4.2 Through Patients Rights Act 
Australia currently utilises patient rights charters. The responsibility for developing and responding 
to patient rights charters and codes is devolved to state and territory governments. The USA 
Veterans Affairs and NZ have charters similar in nature, which cover quality of care, choice and the 
provision of information enabling choice and freedom from discrimination. 
 
Norway has a more specific policy for GP accountability via their 1999 Patients’ Rights Act17 which 
specifies enrolment conditions such as GP requirements to prioritise patients on their list, though it 
also specifies patient responsibilities. It includes a patient’s right to a second opinion, access to 
their records, to complain and to have their case reviewed within 30 days, and for those with long 
term conditions, the right to an individual treatment plan.17 The Patients’ Rights Act ensures that 
every county has a Patients’ Ombudsman whose purpose is to safeguard patients’ rights, interests 
and legal rights in relation to specialist health care, and improve the quality of the health service. 
There seems to be general agreement that such a control system contributes to raising the quality 
of health services.17 
 
The English Patient’s Charter implemented in 1991 was abolished as part of changes to the NHS 
implemented in the year 2000 under the 10-year “NHS plan”. The Patient's Charter was replaced in 
2001 by Your Guide to the NHS: getting the most from your National Health Service which each 
local NHS organisation is required to publish annually.101 
 
5.4.3 Through public transparency 
Public transparency tends to occur through one of two mechanisms: the availability of financial and 
quality indicator reports, and the provision of information on quality statistics and waiting lists via 
websites. It appears that the greater the orientation towards market competition, the more the 
emphasis is on publicly available information. 
 
Governments have launched a number of initiatives to provide web-based information for 
consumers on quality of care and wait time. Providing such information is expected to lead patient-
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consumers to choose the provider who statistically provides the best care, thus creating market-
based competition, with quality improvement and speedier services the target of competition. 
 
Primary Health Organisations in New Zealand report annually on their budgets and annual reports. 
While it is a nationally mandated requirement that these be made available to the public, only 
vague information was available on relevant websites when this document was prepared, and the 
expected reports were not available 
 
The National Health System in the UK provides a search function which allows patients to find 
services in their local area, or according to their health care need or chronic illness. There is 
information on the practices’ ability to meet targets within the Quality and Outcomes Framework 
about managing chronic disease, waiting times and organisation level, as well as information 
derived from patient satisfaction surveys. 
 
In an effort to reduce waiting times for emergency care and surgery and diagnostic imaging, the 
Canadian Ministry of Health and Long Term Care developed a website mapping optimal waiting 
time targets to districts and hospitals.102 They show changes in waiting times since the targets 
were introduced, and provide this information on either a province or hospital-by-hospital basis.  
 
The Netherlands has instituted a similar program, but more focused on the primary health care 
arena. Kies Beter is a public website which provides quality of care information about healthcare 
providers, including general practitioners. Patients may search their local area for a specialist or 
general doctor, with the option of changing practitioners (provided they are registered with their 
Insurance Plan).vii 
  
5.4.4 Through choice and competition 
The ability of health clinic users to hold clinics accountable by exercising their exit option creates 
incentives for responsiveness and service quality improvement. To a certain degree, all health 
systems provide users with the ability to exercise choice, and make practitioners accountable via 
this means. However, it assumes that prerequisites are in place for individuals to make an 
informed choice (such as the provision of accessible information on a specific GPs quality of care) 
and have the means to exercise this choice (such as financial ability to travel to another location). 
This can dampen the effectiveness of exit for accountability.89 It also assumes the availability of 
alternative providers. 
 
5.4.5 Patient satisfaction survey 
The UK Department of Health undertakes a yearly survey of patient experience in general 
practice.61 The survey assesses the performance of a practice against standards set out in the 
"Improved Access Scheme" and "Choice and Booking" Directed Enhanced Services (DES). These 
surveys assess the degree of accessibility and waiting times, and the results are posted on the 
National Health System website. Participation in this program is optional, however financial 
incentives are offered to those GP practices that choose to be involved. 
 
5.5 Identified issues in the development of accountability 
structures 
 The development of performance measures such as National Performance Indicators 
represents an underlying assumption that any health outcomes are entirely the responsibility 
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of the provider and neglects any responsibility from the patient. Rigid performance measures 
may also neglect demographic differences such as high needs populations (eg. the elderly) 
whose health status may be unavoidably different to ‘the optimal’.  
 The development of national performance indicators has met a number of barriers in the 
USA103. The development of appropriate and valid indicators was found to be unexpectedly 
difficult, as were the development of easily accessible data systems with which to assess 
them. There was also speculation that the data entered into these systems were not accurate 
or complete. Linked with this issue is the growing level of public concern that this form of 
accountability is entirely self-reported by the health care providers rather than being audited 
by an independent, external body. 
 The focus on provider accountability overlooks the difficulty of certain patients, or that some 
patients may not manage their conditions as prescribed by their health practitioner.  
 The ideas of public transparency are good in theory, however information needs to be easily 
accessible by all individuals (not just those with computing skills). The NHS has provided a 
telephone line for individuals which would prevent this problem. In NZ where there is a 
significant emphasis on public transparency, the reports which are supposed to be published 
on the PHO websites are not available. 
 For market competition to be a mechanism of accountability, patients must have a choice 
between providers ie. there must be a surplus of provider time when compared to demand.  
 Regulation by professional bodies detracts from the emphasis on patient centred care. 
Individual patients are often not aware of what accreditation with regulatory bodies (such as 
the AGPAL) actually means. 
 Health services are characterized by strong asymmetries among service providers, users and 
oversight bodies in terms of information, expertise and access to services. This asymmetry is 
in part responsiveness to the unique condition of communities and the individual patient list. 
As such, central bodies who oversee accountability mechanisms can experience difficulties in 
monitoring provider performance since providers often control the necessary information.89 
 There is often divergence between public and private interests and incentives, which can 
constrain efforts to increase accountability. 
 Institutional capacity gaps often constrain or undermine efforts to increase accountability for 
all three purposes. The inability of health facilities to track and report on budgets, collection 
of fees, pharmaceutical purchases and supply inventories, vehicles and equipment, and so on, 
limits possibilities for accountability for control and assurance purposes. It results in waste in 
the health system and can create fertile ground for corruption. Further, weak capacity to 
exercise oversight of facility and practitioner performance hampers efforts at accountability 
for the purpose of performance improvement. This capacity gap is aggravated by the 
difficulty in isolating the contributions of various health system actors to achieving 
performance goals.89 
 Disparities between the sanctions that exist ‘on paper’ and capacity to enforce them pose 
equally serious accountability problems. Facilities that lack the ability to identify who works 
there, where they are at a given time, and what they are doing cannot take the first steps 
toward holding staff accountable for performance.89 
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Appendix A: 
Primary health care strategy submissions 
In order to provide context to this review we examined a purposive sample of submissions to the 
Primary Health Strategy consultation provided by the Department. The sample included major 
stakeholder groups, government, members of the Divisions Network, medical organisations, 
Indigenous groups, consumer organisations, allied health organisations, research groups and a 
random selection of submissions from individuals, and GPs. In all, 35 submissions were analysed. 
The following addresses the major issues raised in the submissions, which are discussed in light of 
the international experience. 
 
Choice 
There was no support for mandatory enrolment but voluntary enrolment has moderate support.viii A 
number of submissions mentions choice as an issue for consumers. Choice of GP and practice is 
valued as is the ability to access a second opinionix, to go to a second clinic if they cannot access a 
convenient appointment or to visit different GPs for different purposes, such as a female GP for 
women’s’ health concerns. x An enrolment system needs to take into account the varying skills, 
special training and accreditation of GPs (eg Better outcome in Mental Health or Veterans Affairs) 
and the desire for consumers to see the best GP for their problem. It is suggested that GPs lacking 
skills in some areas could refer to GPs having those skills and report back to the regular GP.xi  
 
Access and equity for marginalised groups and Indigenous people 
Ensuring that any enrolment scheme does not create inequities was a major theme of the 
submissions. Any enrolment scheme needs to ensure that: 
 disadvantaged communities have adequate resources to provide servicesxii 
 people with complex co-morbidity are not selectively omitted from enrolment schemesxiii 
 there is adequate monitoring of lists to monitor for reach across disadvantaged groupsxiv 
 consumers are not discriminated against if they choose not to enrol, resulting in different 
levels of care for those who enrol and those who do not.xv 
 
There was concern that the scheme does not fail to recognise or cater for those with transient 
lifestyles or personal circumstances that make such enrolment impractical or impossible as those 
most likely not to enrol include some of our most disadvantaged individuals and population groups, 
such as the homeless, Indigenous populations, those with mental health issues and those with 
limited incomes. Conversely, it was anticipated that those most likely to enrol are those who 
already enjoy high levels of care.xvi 
 
                                              
viii Sub 198 GPDV; Sub 95 Aust Commission on Quality and Safety in Health Care; Sub 141 AGPN; 
Sub 173 RACGP; Sub 253 RACP; Sub 208 GP NSW; Sub 161 Monash DGP; Sub 198 GPDV. 
ix Sub 169 Consumers Health Forum of Aust 
x Sub 233 Southern GPN; Sub 141 AGPN; Sub 169 Consumers Health Forum of Aust 
xi Sub 174 Alzheimers Assn; Sub 21 Cochrane collab; Sub 84 Ipswich and West Moreton DGP 
xii Sub 057 Health Inequalities Research Collaboration 
xiii Sub 057 Health Inequalities Research Collaboration 
xiv Sub 057 Health Inequalities Research Collaboration 
xv Sub 161 Monash DGP; Sub 198 GPDV 
xvi Sub 169 Consumers Health Forum of Aust; Sub 198 GPDV 
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NACCHO believes that Aboriginal people will be affected in this way and do not support an 
enrolment system, as Aboriginal peoples are highly dispersed and mobile populations and “the 
creation of another bureaucratic layer to health services delivery, with the aim of rationing and 
accounting for health services expenditure, may in fact worsen Aboriginal people’s access to health 
care”.xvii 
 
NACCHO also has concerns about leakage of Indigenous-specific program resources to non-
Aboriginal patients and stresses the importance of being able to identify Aboriginality. The ACCHSs 
sector requires users to establish descent, self identification and community recognition as 
Aboriginal in order to receive services.xviii 
 
Preventive care 
Many see the strength of a patient enrolment scheme as its potential to enable general practices to 
take a population approach and to have clear responsibility for the delivery of PHC services to a 
population. Other advantages include the identification and follow up of patients at risk.xix 
 
Chronic disease 
Many respondents see benefits in a registration system for chronic disease care as it will enable 
practices to identify those patients from whom they are responsible and facilitate improved 
continuity of care.xx Some submissions expressed the hope that patients would be encouraged to 
“own their problems” and that the enrolment process would clarify the mutual responsibilities and 
expectations of providers and patients and remove the fear that active follow up would be seen to 
be soliciting for businessi,xxi  
 
Continuity and coordination of care 
Several respondents saw opportunities in patient enrolment for better coordinated systems of care, 
including better follow up and reminder systems and better models of remuneration of GPs for the 
time spent in coordinating care,xxii and in providing case management for complex care.xxiii 
Enrolment at one practice has the advantage of continuity of care and a strengthened relationship 
between GP and patient. It would also ensure that individual preferences are known and respected, 
provide ongoing opportunities for preventative health care, provide for more accurate prescribing 
and reduce duplication of tests and conflicting advice.xxiv It also avoids fragmentation of the 
medical record as patients do not always tell their usual GP if they have seen somebody else and 
important information may be missing from the record. The importance of this continuity is 
particularly noted for young people.xxv It is however acknowledged by several submissions that a 
                                              
xvii Sub 140 NACCHO 
xviii Sub 140 NACCHO 
xix Sub 198 GPDV; Sub 141 AGPN  
xx Sub 199 WA GP Network; Sub 141 AGPN; Sub 144 Health Issues Centre; Sub 43 SA Dept of 
Health; Sub 145 GP Tasmania; Sub 145 GP Tasmania; Sub 168 Centre PHC & Equity 
xxi Sub 145 GP Tasmania; Sub 168 Centre PHC & Equity 
xxii Sub 168 Centre PHC & Equity; Sub 173 RACGP 
xxiii Sub 95 Aust Commission on Quality and Safety in Health Care 
xxiv Sub 173 RACGP; Sub 253 RAC Physicians; Sub 145 GP Tasmania; Sub 95 Aust Commission on 
Quality and Safety in Health Care; Sub 084 Ipswich and West Moreton DGP 
xxv Sub 52 Youth Health Research Group 
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de facto enrolment system operates as patients with chronic disease often see the same doctor 
over a long period of time.xxvi The concept of a “medical home” is mentioned which encompasses 
these ideas.xxvii 
 
Administration of registers and data management 
The requirements for establishing and maintaining accurate patient enrolment registers must not 
be underestimated and is mentioned by a number of respondents. Integrated data and information 
management is suggested, as well as well supported, easy to use reliable systems. If data 
collection is incomplete or not reliable it will become invalid. Significant capital and expertise will be 
required for development.  
 
The need for good population data was emphasised in order to provide a basis for planning health 
care for the population, to provide enhanced information about access to services, to underpin a 
needs based funding mechanism and to support planning and resource allocation.xxviii  
 
The resources required to incentivize and promote enrolment must also be considered.xxix One 
suggestion is to provide a higher MBS rebate for enroleesxxx, however this may lead to inequities as 
described above. 
 
eHealth will make it unnecessary 
While the importance of good data and IT structures to support patient enrolment was stressed, 
others suggest strongly that, due to the unique health care identifiers currently being developed by 
the National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA) and a developed eHealth record, patient 
enrolment will become unnecessary.xxxi One submission says that eHealth would be the “greatest 
thing since the stethoscope”.xxxii 
 
Considerations 
A number of points were made in the submissions regarding aspects of enrolment: 
 There needs to be consideration of how enrolment would work in areas of GP shortage and 
how it would affect access.xxxiii 
 It is important that an enrolment system makes allowances for people who are travelling.xxxiv 
 Patient enrolment need not be restricted to enrolment with GPs and there are calls for 
enrolment to cover access to nurses, nurse practitioners and culturally specific health 
workers.xxxv 
 There also needs to be safeguards against gaming the system. One respondent suggested 
that if certain MBS item numbers can only be paid to the enrolled practice there needs to be a 
                                              
xxvi Sub 121 G Miller (Family Medicine Research Centre) 
xxvii Aust Commission on Quality and Safety in Health Care 
xxviii Sub 226 APHCRI 
xxix Sub 208 GP NSW; Sub 146 GPSA 
xxx Sub 145 GP Tasmania 
xxxi Sub 169 Consumers Health Forum of Aust; Sub 165 Northern Sydney DGP; Sub 084 Ipswich 
and West Moreton DGP; Sub 188 Capricornia DGP; Sub 226 APHCRI; Sub 146 GPSA; Sub 21 
Cochrane collaboration 
xxxii Sub 084 Ipswich and West Moreton DGP 
xxxiii Sub 84 Ipswich and West Moreton DGP 
xxxiv Sub 21 Cochrane collab; Sub 141 AGPN 
xxxv Sub 104 Aust College of Nurse Practitioners; Sub 078 PHCRED WA 
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mechanism to avoid a GP who sees the patient once claiming the item, preventing the regular 
GP from doing so.xxxvi 
 There needs to be a safeguard against GPs selecting patients with less problems and more 
motivation, particularly if reporting is linked to positive or negative incentives for GPs or 
practices.xxxvii 
 The enrolment system needs to maintain the rights of patients in the health system as set 
out in the Australian Charter of Healthcare Rights in 2008.xxxviii 
 
Concerns 
Other concerns about patient enrolment related to:  
 fears the it would lead to rationing of care on the basis of cost rather than need,xxxix  
 concerns about patient enrolment on the basis of a specific condition, rather than ‘whole 
person’ will undermine holistic patient carexl 
 Concerns over patient control and the removal of choicexli 
 Concerns that enrolment/ eHealth may not uphold the privacy of teenage children.xlii 
                                              
 
                                              
xxxvi Sub 84 Ipswich and West Moreton DGP 
xxxvii Sub 84 Ipswich and West Moreton DGP 
xxxviii Sub 95 Aust Commission on Quality and Safety in Health Care 
xxxix Sub 161 Monash DGP 
xl Sub 198 DPDV; Sub 161 Monash DGP; Sub 173 RACGP; Sub 21 Cochrane collaboration 
xli Sub 21 Cochrane collab. 
xlii Sub 21 Cochrane collab. 
